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Abstract
The recent approach ‘subgame consistency’ in cooperative stochastic dif-
ferential games by Yeung and Petrosjan (2006) and Yeung and Petrosjan
(2004) is applied to the classical Coase theorem in the presence of sto-
chastic stock externalities. The dynamic Coasean bargaining solution is
identified involving a negotiated plan of externality trade over time as well
as subgame consistent Coasean liability payments flow under different as-
signments of property rights. The agent with the right to determine the
externality has the advantage to choose his own private equilibrium as the
initial condition in the dynamic system of the Coasean bargaining solu-
tion. The dynamic Coasean bargaining solution is formulated followed by
an illustration showing an analytical tractable solution.
Keywords: dynamic cooperative games, cooperative stochastic differ-
ential games, dynamic stability, Coase theorem
JEL classification: C71, C73, Q53, Q56
1 Introduction
The paper by Coase (1960) is one of the most well known papers in the economic
literature. It contains an illustrative argument that a difference between private
and social costs will disappear, resulting in a Pareto efficient outcome, if two
agents are allowed to bargain about the level of externality. If the Coase theorem
works, all that is necessary to cure the inefficient allocation is a common law that
clearly assigns well-defined rights over the level of externality to one of the agents
rather than a social planner that enforces a Pareto optimal externality level.
There is a vast literature on the Coase theorem covering a wide range of aspects,
however, so far analyzes of the Coase theorem have not yet been performed in
dynamic game theory with stock externalities, and nevertheless stochastic stock
externalities. One possible reason for this is the technical difficulties within
cooperative (stochastic) differential game theory.
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An early paper on extending the Nash bargaining solution to cooperative
differential games was Haurie (1976) pointing out the difficulties of ‘dynamic
instability’. However, during the last decade there has been a growing litera-
ture on time consistent and dynamic stability in cooperative differential games
e.g. Petrosjan and Zenkevich (1996), Petrosjan (1997) and Filar and Petrosjan
(2000). There is also a literature on time consistent side payments in upstream-
downstream problems e.g. (Jorgensen and Zaccour, 2001) and Haurie and Za-
ccour (1995). Recently, a literature has emerged on the issue of finding time
consistent payoff distributions in cooperative stochastic differential games, e.g.
Yeung and Petrosjan (2004) (TU-games), Yeung (2004) and Yeung and Petros-
jan (2005) (NTU-games). In this paper, the classical set up of the Coase theorem
in the upstream-downstream case, adding stochastic stock externalities, is an-
alyzed using the recent discoveries in cooperative stochastic differential game
theory.
Consider first the static case of Coase theorem that is well known in the liter-
ature. The upstream agent has the legal right to determine the externality (e.g.
emit pollution) and the starting point is upstream agent’s private equilibrium
activity level. The downstream agent, who suffers from the upstream externality
(e.g. pollution), then has an incentive to offer a compensation to the upstream
agent provided that he reduces the externality level. Since downstream agent
knows upstream agent’s objective function, the former can offer an allocation
flow, which increases upstream agent’s utility and gives him an incentive to ac-
cept the offer. Continuing this process of Pareto improvements the agents would
eventually end up in a Pareto optimal activity levels. By symmetry, the same
result holds if the downstream agent has the right the determine the level of
externality (be free from pollution). Pareto improvement is possible because the
reductions in externality levels and the private gains can be traded between the
agents. Since one agent has the right to determine the externality and the gains
to the other agent from reduction in externality level are private, the market
mechanism will lead the bargaining agents to a Pareto efficient outcome just as
for ordinary goods and services where rights are defined.
Moreover, the Coase theorem states that initial assignment of rights (e.g.
whether a polluter is given the right to pollute or a sufferer is given the right to
be free from pollution) does not affect the Pareto optimal outcome (efficiency
proposition). Some arguments also include that the final allocation of resources
will be the same regardless assignments of rights (invariance proposition). The
first argument can be considered as a weak version of Coase theorem and both
arguments together as a strong version of the Coase theorem. Several papers
have discussed the limits of the theorem by setting up assumptions under which
the theorem holds or does not hold. The theorem has been stated in different
ways, e.g. Regan (1972), Calabresi (1968) and Fresh (1979), but in general the
common assumptions usually involve an economy with perfect competition, two
actors to each externality bargain, perfect information, no wealth effects and
zero transactions costs. For a discussion on assumptions see e.g. Hoffman and
Spitzer (1982). The majority of the papers in literature concerns imperfections
within the Coase bargaining process such as transaction costs and other im-
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perfections that may disturb the bargaining process, such as insufficient rent
to be able to pay liabilities (Tybout, 1972) and (Wellisz, 1964), non-convexity
(Starret, 1972), imperfect information in noncooperative game theory (Saraydar,
1983), moral hazard (Kamien et al., 1966) and (Tybout, 1972), private infor-
mation (Schweizer, 1988) and different kind of transaction costs, e.g. (Allen,
1991) and (Barzel, 1989). This paper does not deal with aspects of imperfec-
tions within the Coase bargaining process but will assume that the bargaining
process takes place at time t = 0 with no transaction costs and results in a
Pareto optimal bargaining outcome. The contribution of this paper is rather of
another dimension. It illustrates the Coase theorem in a dynamic model with
stock dynamics. The essential difference, compared to the static analysis that
has been performed hitherto, is that the initial bargaining not only concerns
an externality level with a corresponding lump sum reallocation, but rather a
‘plan’ of Pareto optimal controls and a liability payment flow to the agent that
has the legal right to determine the externality level.
1.1 The Coase Theorem and Stock Externalities
We suppose that Coasean bargaining between two agents takes place at t = 0
and that the agreement contains a future ‘plan’ of agreed (Pareto optimal)
reductions in externality level, as well as a corresponding flow of liability (com-
pensation) payment to the agent that has the legal right to determine the level
of externality. What conditions should a Coasean bargaining solution satisfy
in a model with stock dynamics? Firstly, the initial conditions of the dynamic
system are connected to the assignment of rights. For example, if the upstream
agent has the right to determine the externality (pollute), then the initial con-
dition should be the private equilibrium of upstream agent. Conversely, if the
downstream agent has the right determine the externality (be free from pol-
lution), the initial condition is the private equilibrium of downstream agent.
The Coasean bargaining solution (CBS) policy then involves a move from any
of these initial states toward the Coasean steady state. Secondly, the emission
flow and the necessary liability payment flow should be such that both agents
are at least as well of with the bargain as without the bargain (individual ra-
tionality). Thirdly, we expect that the bargaining process at time t = 0 goes
on until there are no further Pareto improvements, i.e. the bargaining outcome
should belong to the Pareto optimal set (group rationality). The fourth issue is
time consistency due to the extension to stock externalities. While the process
goes on over time, the optimal conditions agreed at time t = 0 should remain.
As a result, the plan in an agreement signed prior to t0 may no longer be op-
timal anymore at, say t ≥ t0, and rational agents abandon the agreement at t
and the planned motions in initial agreement are therefore said to be ‘dynam-
ically instable’ (Haurie, 1976). The initial plan should be time consistent, viz.
include rules how the agents jointly should react to changes in interests in order
to maintain the original optimal agreement at each instant of time. There are
several definitions of time consistency and in this paper we follow Petrosjan
(1997) subgame consistent concept implying that that the individual payoff at
3
each instant of time over the remaining process should be no less than what
the agents could get by abandon the agreement. Time consistency then implies
that the initial bargaining outcome plan is maintained (i.e. remains optimal)
along the process as t goes to infinity and the solution approaches the expected
steady state.
The disposition of the paper is as follows: In section 2, threat strategies are
identified and tied to the assignment of rights and a time consistent Coasean
bargaining solution is formulated introducing time consistent Coasean liability
payment flows. Section 3 presents an analytically tractable solution which is
followrd by a summary.
2 Coasean Bargaining with Stock Externalities
Consider two agents, agent 1 is the upstream agent that owns and invests in an
upstream stock k1(t). Agent 2 is the downstream agent that owns and invests
in the downstream stock k2(t). The state space of the game is K ∈ R2 and the
state dynamics is described by the stochastic differential equations
dk1(t) = f1[k1(t), c1(t)] + σ1[k1(t), t]dz1(t) (1)
dk2(t) = f2[k1(t), k2(t), c2(t)] + σ2[k2(t), t]dz2(t) (2)
The upstream stock k1(t) also enters (2), generating an upstream-downstream
stock externality. The growth contain a stochastic growth process of each capital
stock where dzi is the increment of a Wiener process zi(t) with variance σ2i ≥
0 and cov(zizj) = 0 for i = 1, 2 and i 6= j. The instantaneous payoff at
time s ∈ [0,∞) to each agent i = 1, 2 is gi[ci(t)] which may be referred to as
consumption activity at time s. The control space contains the feasible activities
(c2, c1) ⊆ R2+. The state space is the two-dimensional space (k2, k1) ⊆ R2+. We
assume that the instantaneous payoffs can be transfered across agents and time.
The payoff function to agent i = 1, 2 is then∫ ∞
0
gi[ci(t)]e−ρitdt i = 1, 2 (3)
where ρi > 0 is an agent-specific discount rate.
2.1 Coasean Bargaining Solution (CBS)
In static analysis it is well-known that the Coase theorem states that two agents
in the upstream-downstream problem could gain if there are well-defined prop-
erty rights and a negotiated compensation is paid by one agent to the other
agent for a corresponding decrease in externality level. Recall the following
facts about Coasean bargaining situation:
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(1) Let agent i have the right to determine the level of externality
(e.g. the right to pollute if upstream agent or the right to be free
from pollution if downstream agent).
(2) Agent j, where i 6= j, that lacks the right to determine the exter-
nality level collects private gains from a negotiated reduction in
externality level (a reduction in damage rate as downstream agent
or an increase in permitted pollution level as a upstream agent)
Pareto improvement is possible because the reductions in externality levels in (1)
and the gains in (2) can be traded between the agents. Consider the case when
two agents can negotiate at t = 0. Since the dynamic model involves changes in
stock levels over time, a Coasean bargaining solution (CBS) policy is a plan of
trade that spans over time and contains (1) agreed reduction in externality flow
and (2) corresponding liability payment flows paid by j to i as compensation for
the successive decreases in externality level over time. Moreover, when societies
come together and negotiate at t = 0, they may a mistake and therefore the
CBS should involve closed loop solutions so that the initial plan remains optimal.
Define a time consistent CBS policy as
Π(k1, k2, t) =
{
φo1(k1, k2, t), φ
o
2(k1, k2, t), L
o
i (k1, k2, t)
}
i = 1, 2 (4)
ko1(0) = k
i
1, k
o
2(0) = k
i
2
as a bargaining outcome that is agreed before the process starts at t0 and is
valid for t ∈ [t0,∞) and where Loi (k1, k2, t) is the instantaneous flow of Coasean
liability payment to agent i that has the right to determine the externality level.
We require that the bargaining solution Π(k1, k2, t) satisfies individual ra-
tionality
Wi(k1, k2, t) ≥ Vi(k1, k2, t) i = 1, 2 (5)
and that the bargaining outcome belongs to the Pareto optimal set, i.e. group
rationality holds
2∑
m=1
Wi(k1, k2, t) = W (k1, k2, t) (6)
We follow (Petrosjan, 1997) and Yeung and Petrosjan (2004) and require that
Wi(k1, k2, t) for i = 1, 2 are continuously twice differentiable in t and (k1, k2)
and that
W ti (k1, k2, t) = W
τ
i (k1, k2, t)e
ρi(τ−t) t0 ≤ t ≤ τ for i = 1, 2 (7)
The bargained outcome before time t = 0 remains optimal over time in any
possible future state that results from current optimal behavior of the actors as
well as stochastic changes in the process.
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2.1.1 Closed-Loop Threat Strategies
Before the bargaining begins, the agents i = 1, 2 make clear their threat strate-
gies c∗i (t) given the assignment of rights. Agent i = 1, 2 maximizes utility by
choosing optimal activity level ci(t) in the optimal control problems given that
the other agent j 6= i maximizes utility in a non-cooperative solution.
max
ci(t)
∫ ∞
0
gi[ci(t)]e−ρitdt i = 1, 2 (8)
s.t.
f1[k1(t), c1(t)] + σ1[k1(t), t]dz1(t) (9)
f2[k1(t), k2(t), c2(t)] + σ2[k2(t), t]dz2(t) (10)
k1(0) = k1,0 k2(0) = k2,0 (11)
Clearly, in the Coasean bargaining the upstream agent has an advantage of
being unaffected by the downstream agent, however, the assignment of rights
will be conclusive for this advantage. Maximizing the corresponding dynamic
programming equations corresponding to the problems above give the closed-
loop threat strategies
c∗i (ki, t) = φi[ki(t), t] i = 1, 2 (12)
given the initial conditions (k1(0), k2(0)) determined by the agent that has the
right to determine the externality level. If the dynamic programming equation is
time autonomous with infinite time horizon, the controls in (12) will be Markov
stationary and subgame perfect as it also holds off the equilibrium path.
2.1.2 Assignment of Rights and Initial Conditions
The initial conditions (k1(0), k2(0)) could be any point in the feasible state space,
though, it is reasonable that the initial states be connected to the assignment
of rights. If upstream agent has the right to determine the of externality level,
then the initial conditions should be the private equilibrium PE1 steady state
and downstream agent has to take this as given. Conversely, if downstream
agent has the right to determine the externality level, the initial condition is
the PE2 steady state and the upstream agent has to take this choice of initial
conditions as given.
Suppose upstream agent 1 has the right to determine the externality. The initial
condition is the private equilibrium PE1(0) of upstream agent 1, denoted as
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ko1(0) = k¯u1 ≥ 0 (13)
ko2(0) = k¯u2 ≥ 0
Suppose instead that downstream agent 2 has the right to determine the exter-
nality generated by upstream activity. The initial condition is the steady state
private equilibrium PE2(0) of downstream agent 2
ko1(0) = k¯d1 = 0 (14)
ko2(0) = k¯d2 ≥ 0
Since agent 2 receives no benefit but damage costs from the externality, he
would not allow any externality in a non-cooperative equilibrium, and hence,
the initial condition in a bargaining solution is ko1(0) = 0. This actually implies
that agent 2 imposes the restriction k1(t) = 0 on agent 1 in the non-cooperative
equilibrium, implying that ť agent 1’s disagreement value function is V1 ≡ 0.
2.1.3 Pareto Optimal Trajectories
We suppose that negotiation, which takes place at t = 0, proceeds until no
further Pareto improvements are possible. Let Wi be the payoff (before distrib-
ution of joint payoff) to agent i = 1, 2, that results from a negotiation that goes
on until the total payoff W = W1 +W2 is maximized. Thus, the agents agree
to solve the joint stochastic optimal control problem.
Definition 1 Let E be the expectation operator, then if there exists a value
function W (k1, k2, t) that satisfies
W (k1, k2, t) = (15)
E
{∫ ∞
0
2∑
i=1
gi[koi (t), c
o
i (t)]e
−ρitdt
}
≥ E
{∫ ∞
0
2∑
i=1
gi[ki(t), ci(t)]e−ρitdt
}
for all ci(k1, k2, t) in the feasible set ci ⊆ R2+ for i = 1, 2 which satisfy the
stochastic growth processes in the (k2, k1) state space
dk1(t) = [f1[ko1(t), c
o
1(t)] dt+ σ1k
o
1dz1 (16)
dk2(t) = [f2[ko1(t), k
o
2(t), c
o
2(t)] dt+ σ2k
o
2dz2 (17)
ko1(0) = k¯x1 k
o
2(0) = k¯x2 x = u, d (18)
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then the closed loop Pareto optimal control paths are
coi (t) = φi
(
ko1, k
o
2, t
)
(19)
for i = 1, 2
The value function W (k1, k2, t) in (15) and the dynamic system (16) - (18)
should to satisfy the Isaacs-Bellman-Fleming partial differential equation system
(Basar and Olsder, 1999).
−∂W (k1, k2, t)
∂t
= (20)
max
c1,c2
[ 2∑
i=1
gi[ki(t), ci(t)]e−ρit
]
e−ρit
+
∂W
∂k1(t)
f1[k1(t), c1(t)] +
1
2
∂2W
∂k21
σ21k1(t)
2
+
∂W
∂k2(t)
f2[k1(t), k2(t), c2(t)] +
1
2
∂2W
∂k22
σ22k2(t)
2
Maximizing (20) and identifying the value functionW (k1, k2, t) yield the optimal
controls
coi (t, k1(t)) i = 1, 2 (21)
In general, the Pareto optimal solution involves a shift of net growth from
the stock of the agent that has the right to determine the level of externality to
the stock of the agent that does not have the right to determine the externality.
If the dynamic programming equation in (20) is time autonomous with infinite
time horizon, the controls will be Markov stationary (i.e. functions of only state
variables).
2.1.4 Coasean Liability Payment Flows
Since the Isaacs-Bellman-Fleming differential equation is satisfied, the Pareto
optimal trajectories are also time consistent, however, this does not imply that
the payoff distribution after the instantaneous liability payment is time consis-
tent. Recall that a Pareto improvement bargaining is possible because agent
i has the right to determine the level of externality (the right to pollute or
the right to be free from pollution) while agent j receives gains from negotia-
tion (e.g. a reduction in damage rate as downstream agent or an increase in
permitted pollution level as an upstream agent) and that these reductions in
externality and private gains can be traded over time. We suppose that the
egalitarian principle holds. The expected present value of agent i’s share in a
Pareto optimal allocation resulting from a negotiation taking place at t = 0 is
8
Wi ≡ Vi + 12
[
W (k1, k2, t)−
2∑
m=1
Vm(k1, k2, t)
]
≥ 0 (22)
where Wi(k1, k2, t) is the payoff to agent i = 1, 2 after liability payment and
Vi is identified as the payoff to agent i in agent i’s private equilibrium solution
PEi given the assignment of property rights. The formulation suggests that
individual payoffs are transferable across agents and time. The expression within
brackets in (22) is by nature of joint maximization always nonnegative. The
total payoff is
W (k1, k2, t) = W1(k1, k2, t) +W2(k1, k2, t) (23)
= E
∫ ∞
t0
2∑
m=1
gi[koi (t)]e
−ρitdt
Let agent i be the agent with the right to determine the externality, then (22)
implies that the total liability payment over the whole planning period t ∈ [0,∞)
by agent j to i is
Λji (k1, k2, t) =
1
2
[(Wj − Vj)− (Wi − Vi)] ≤ 0 i 6= j (24)
using (23) the total liability payment by j to i in exchange for a reduction in
externality level is
Λji (k1, k2, t) = Wj −
∫ ∞
t0
gj [koj (t), φj [k
o
j (t)]]e
−ρjtdt ≤ 0 i 6= j (25)
or in other terms, using (22)
Λji (k1, k2, t) = Vj +
1
2
[
W (k1, k2, t)−
2∑
m=1
Vm(k1, k2, t)
]
(26)
−
∫ ∞
t0
gj [koj (t), φj [k
o
j (t)]]e
−ρjtdt ≤ 0 i 6= j
Proposition 1 If agent i is the agent with the right to determine the external-
ity, then the instantaneous liability payment flow Lji (k1, k2, t) from agent j to
agent i for a Pareto optimal reduction in externality flow, should satisfy
Lji (k1, k2, t) ≡
∂Λji
∂t
(k1, k2, t) = (27)
−1
2
[
∂W
∂t
+
2∑
m=1
∂W
∂km
∂km
∂t
(co1, c
o
2, k1, k2, t) +
2∑
m=1
∂2W
∂k2m
σm(km, t)
]
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+
1
2
[
∂Vi
∂t
+
2∑
m=1
∂Vi
∂km
∂km
∂t
(co1, c
o
2, k1, k2, t) +
2∑
m=1
∂2Vi
∂k2m
σm(km, t)
]
−1
2
[
∂Vj
∂t
+
2∑
m=1
∂Vm
∂km
∂km
∂t
(co1, c
o
2, k1, k2, t) +
2∑
m=1
∂2Vj
∂k2m
σm(km, t)
]
−gj [koj (t), φi[koj (t)]]e−ρjt ≤ 0
i 6= j
Proof: Using (26) and applying theorem 3.1 in Yeung and Petrosjan (2004).
Then we are ready to define a subgame consistent Coasean bargaining solu-
tion as follows.
Definition 2 Let agent i be the agent with the right to determine the externality
level at each t ∈ (0,∞) and agent j where i 6= j the agent that gains from a
reduction in externality level with defined optimal control problems (8) - (11).
Let agent i and j negotiate a Coasean bargaining solution Π(k1, k2, t) at time
t = 0 that satisfies
i) Individual rationality in (5)
ii) Group rationality in (6)
iii) Time consistency in (7)
iii) Subgame consistent Coasean liability payment flow in proposition 1
iv) Initial conditions (ki1, ki2) identified as agent i’s PEi steady state
then Π(k1, k2, t) is a subgame consistent Coasean bargaining solution (CBS).
3 Analytical Illustration
In this section we illustrate the suggested CBS in definition 2 by an analytically
tractable upstream-downstream problem. Consider two agents, 1 and 2, that
may be considered as an upstream region and downstream region. Upstream
agent 1 owns and uses capital stock k1(t) while downstream agent 2 owns and
uses capital stock k2(t) as input in the production functions yi(t) = φiki(t)1/2,
where φi > 0 is the technology level and i = 1, 2. Upstream activity generates
pollution flow P (t) = ϕy1(t) (where ϕ > 0 is a pollution parameter), which
damages downstream capital stock k2 of agent 2 as described by the dynamics
(29) - (31). To simplify calculation, it assumed that agent 1’s capital stock is
not damaged by own emissions without loss of generality. The growth process
of each capital stock follows a stochastic process implying that externality is
stochastic as well. Both agents i = 1, 2 maximize utility by choosing optimal
consumption level ci(t) in the stochastic optimal control problems (28) and (31),
which are described hereinafter
max
ci(t)
∫ ∞
0
ci(t)1/2e−ρitdt i = 1, 2 (28)
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s.t.
dk1(t) =
[
φ1k1(t)1/2 − δ1k1(t)− c1(t)
]
dt+ σ1k1dz1 (29)
dk2(t) =
[
φ2k2(t)1/2 − δ2k2(t)− c2(t)− ϕy1(t)
y2(t)
k2(t)
]
dt+ σ2k2dz2 (30)
k1(0) = k1,0 k2(0) = k2,0 i = 1, 2 (31)
ρi > 0 are agent-specific discount rates and δi > 0 in (29) and (30) are depre-
cation rates for i = 1, 2. The fourth term on the RHS in (30) is the endogenous
damage rate to downstream capital. The greater P (t) = ϕy1(t) is relative to
y2(t), the greater is the decay rate. Finally, (29) and (30) contain the stochastic
growth process of each capital stock where dzi is the increment of a Wiener
process zi(t) with variance σ2i ≥ 0 and cov(zizj) = 0 for i = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
Since agent 1 is unaffected by agent 2’s activities, the non-cooperative equi-
librium of problems (28) - (31) coincides with agent 1’s private equilibrium that
is solved in appendix A.1. The closed-loop strategies are
c∗i (ki, t) =
(
2ρi + δi +
σ2i
4
)2
ki(t) i = 1, 2 (32)
Equation (32) shows that activity ci is proportional to the size of own capital
stock ki. A myopic (high ρi) agent would prefer greater activity today (decreas-
ing saving rate). If the variance σ2i of the stochastic process of capital increases,
current activity increases for given levels of stock (saving rate falls). This is
connected to a decrease in the shadow prices for given levels of own stock in
(33) where u1(k1, t) and d1(k2, t) are agent 1’s closed loop shadow prices and
u2(k1, t) and d2(k2, t) agent 2’s shadow prices. The greater volatility of capi-
tal accumulation, the smaller is the value of a unit of capital and the smaller
is the saving rate with the corresponding increase in current consumption and
emissions for given stock level.
u1(k1, t) ≡ ∂V1
∂k1
(k1, t) =
1
2
(
1
2ρ1 + δ1 +
σ21
2
) 1
2 1
k1(t)
1
2
(33)
d1(k2, t) ≡ ∂V1
∂k1
(k2, t) = 0
u2(k1, t) ≡ ∂V2
∂k1
(k1, t) = −12
(
1
2ρ1 + δ1 +
σ21
4
)(
1
2ρ2 + δ2 +
σ22
4
) 1
2
ϕ
k1(t)
1
2
d2(k2, t) ≡ ∂V2
∂k2
(k2, t) =
1
2
(
1
2ρ2 + δ2 +
σ22
2
) 1
2 1
k2(t)
1
2
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An increase in the depreciation rates give the same effect. Not surprisingly,
upstream agent 1 has a zero shadow price d1(k2, t) of downstream stock, while
downstream agent 2 has a shadow cost u2(k1, t) of upstream stock, which is
proportional to the pollution parameter ϕ.
Agent 2’s downstream optimal control problem is tied to agent 1’s optimal
control problem. An increase in activity by upstream agent 1, reduces down-
stream stock levels via the damage rate ϕy1(t)/y2(t), which in turn increases
downstream agent’s shadow price d2(k2, t) of own stock. Downstream optimal
activity decreases. The lower stock level of downstream agent, the greater is the
damage rate and the greater is the reduction in activity, ceteris paribus. With-
out rights there is nothing else that downstream agent can do than to choose
optimal activity given the upstream agent’s optimal control activity.
3.1 Upstream Agent Determines Externality - Initial Con-
ditions
Suppose upstream agent 1 has the right to determine the externality. The
initial condition is the private equilibrium PE1 steady state of upstream agent
1, denoted as (ku1 , ku2 ) and derived in appendix A.1.
ko1(0) = k¯u1 =
[
φ1
2ρ1 + δ1 + σ21/4)
]2
(34)
ko2(0) = k¯u2 =
φ2 − ϕφ1/φ22ρ1+δ1+σ21/4
2ρ2 + δ2 + σ22/4
2
Note that ϕ > 0 holds back the steady state of downstream capital stock com-
pared to agent 1’s private equilibrium steady state. The level k¯u2 is the steady
state when agent 2 is maximizing utility, given the choice k¯u1 of upstream agent 1.
3.2 Downstream Agent Determines Externality - Initial
Conditions
Suppose instead that downstream agent 2 has the right to determine the ex-
ternality. The initial condition is the steady state private equilibrium PE2 of
downstream agent 2 (kd1 , kd2) which is derived in appendix A.2.
ko1(0) = 0 (35)
ko2(0) = k¯d2 =
[
φ2
2ρ2 + δ2 + σ22/4
]2
Since agent 2 receives no benefit but damage costs from P and y1 it would not
allow any upstream activity, and hence, the initial condition in a bargaining
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solution is ko1(0) = 0 and P = 0. The level k¯d2 is the steady state when agent 2
is maximizing utility given kd1 = 0. This actually implies that agent 2 imposes
the restriction dk1/dt = 0 on agent 1 implying that V1 ≡ 0.
3.3 Pareto Optimal Trajectories
We suppose that negotiation, which takes place prior to t = 0, proceeds until
no further Pareto improvements are possible. Let Wi be the payoff to agent
i = 1, 2, then negotiation goes on until the total payoff W = W1 + W2 is
maximized. Thus, the agents agree to solve the joint stochastic optimal control
problem
Definition 3 Let E be the expectation operator, then if there exists a value
function W (k1, k2, t) that satisfies
W (k1, k2, t) = (36)
E
{∫ ∞
0
[
co1(t)
1
2 + co2(t)
1
2
]
e−ρitdt
}
≥ E
{∫ ∞
0
[
c1(t)
1
2 + c2(t)
1
2
]
e−ρitdt
}
for all ci(k1, k2, t) in the feasible set ci ⊆ R2+ for i = 1, 2 which satisfy the
stochastic growth processes in the (k2, k1) state space
dk1(t) =
[
φ1k
o
1(t)
1/2 − δ1ko1(t)− c1
]
dt+ σ1ko1dz1 (37)
dk2(t) =
[
φ2k
o
2(t)
1/2 − δ2ko2(t)− c2 − ϕ
yo1(t)
yo2(t)
ko2(t)
]
dt+ σ2ko2dz2 (38)
ko1(0) = k¯x1 k
o
2(0) = k¯x2 x = u, d (39)
then the closed loop Pareto optimal control paths are
coi
(
k1, k2, t
)
(40)
for i = 1, 2 of the problems defined in (28) - (31).
The value function in definition 1 and the dynamic system (37) - (39) should to
satisfy the Bellman-Fleming partial differential equation system for stochastic
optimal control (Fleming and Richel, 1975).
∂W (k1, k2, t)
∂t
= (41)
max
c1,c2
[
c1(t)
1
2 + c2(t)
1
2
]
e−ρit
13
+
∂W
∂k1(t)
[
φ1k1(t)1/2 − δ1k1(t)− c1(t)
]
dt+
1
2
∂2W
∂k21
σ21k1(t)
2
+
∂W
∂k2(t)
[
φ2k2(t)1/2 − δ2k2(t)− c2(t)− ϕy1(t)
y2(t)
k2(t)
]
dt+
1
2
∂2W
∂k22
σ22k2(t)
2
Maximizing (41) and solving for coi (k1, k2, t), i = 1, 2.
co1(k1(t)) =
(
1
a
)2
k1(t) (42)
co2(k2(t)) =
(
1
b
)2
k2(t) (43)
The values of a and b are solved explicitly in appendix A.3. Since a ≤ a1 the
joint maximized upstream consumption is higher than in agent 1’s PE1 in (32),
i.e. the investment and growth of agent 1 is lower than in PE1. Since the
damage rate is reduced, the optimal consumption level of agent 2 is greater
than in PE1. Thus the Pareto optimal solution involves a shift of net growth
between the agents where upstream net growth falls and downstream net growth
increases.
Since (41) is time autonomous with infinite time horizon, the controls are
Markov stationary (i.e. functions of only state variables). The value function
in definition 1 is next to be defined in order to specify the optimal controls in
(42) and (43).
Proposition 2 The value function in (44) satisfy definition 1 and the indirect
HJB partial differential equation system (20)
W
(
k1(t), k2(t)
)
=
(
ak1(t)
1
2 + bk2(t)
1
2 + c
)
e−ρit (44)
Proof : Appendix A.3 which also defines (a, b, c) explicitly. Q.E.D.
Since the Bellman-Fleming differential equation is satisfied, the Pareto optimal
trajectories are also time consistent.
3.4 Upstream Agent Determines the Externality Flow
Consider first the case when upstream agent 1 has the right to pollute and
downstream agent 2 has to pay a liability payment flow to 1 for reducing the
emissions flow. The initial condition is the private equilibrium PE1 steady
state (34) where agent 1 is producing at the private equilibrium level. After
bargaining, the process starts from (34) and moves along the Pareto optimal
controls in (42) and (43) with the stochastic processes
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dk1(t) = φ1ko1(t)
1/2 − δ1ko1(t)−
(
1
a
)2
ko1(t) + σ1k1dz1 (45)
dk2(t) = φ2ko2(t)
1/2 − δ2ko2(t)−
(
1
b
)2
ko2(t)− ϕ
yo1(t)
yo2(t)
ko2(t) + σ2k2dz2
This is a process of reallocation of net growths where net growth of agent 1 falls
and net growth of agent 2 increases along the process between the PE1 steady
state at t = 0 as initial condition and the CSS. Since 1 has the right to pollute, 2
must pay the instantaneous liability payment flow L21(k1(t)) to 1 to compensate
the lower net growth in agent 1. Applying proposition 1 to the problems (28) -
(31) and simplifying by using (64), (65) and (75) give the instantaneous Coasean
liability payment flow from agent 2 to 1 as compensation for reduction in the
externality by 1
L21(k1(t)) =
1
2
{
(a− a1 + a2)
(
2ρi + δ1 +
1
2a2
)
+
bϕφ1
φ2
}
k1(t)
1
2 ≤ 0 (46)
It follows that the payment flow can also be derived as
L12(k1(t)) =
1
2
{
(a+ a1 − a2)
(
2ρi + δ1 +
1
2a2
)
− 1
a
}
k1(t)
1
2 ≥ 0 (47)
By using (64), (65) and (75), it is straightforward to double check that
L21(k1(t)) + L
1
2(k1(t)) ≡ 0 (48)
The first term on the RHS in (46) is nonpositive since a2 ≤ 0 and a ≤ a1.
The last term on the RHS is a share of the instantaneous gain (reduction in
instantaneous cost) that downstream agent gets from the reduction in upstream
emissions. The greater is ϕ the greater is the instantaneous gain.1 The liability
flow can alternatively, L21(k1, t) be expressed as a fixed share of 1’s production
L21(k1, t) =
1
2φ1
{
(a+ a1 − a2)
(
2ρi + δ1 +
1
2a2
)
− 1
a
}
y1(t) (50)
1It can be shown that a sufficient condition for a bargaining solution that satisfies individual
rationality and also time consistency at each instant of time, i.e. it also satisfies Petrosjan
(1997), is
ϕ ≥ 8φ2
φ1
√
ρi +
δ2
2
(49)
The pollution parameter must not be too low relative to the ratio between downstream and
upstream technology level. Moreover, volatility and depreciation rate of downstream stock
must not be too high as this may violate the inequality.
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Agent 2 has to compensate 1’s loss by a fixed share of 1’s production. The
greater 1’s production, the greater is the instantaneous flow that 2 must pay to
1 at each instant of time.
The corresponding steady state liability payment flow from 2 to 1 is found
by substituting the expected steady state E[k1,∞] into (46)
E[L21,∞] =
{
1
2φ1
(a+ a1 − a2)
(
2ρi + δ1 +
1
2a2
)
− 1
a
}
E[k1/21,∞] (51)
This illustrates the redistribution effects over time from different assignments of
rights. Agent 2 must continue paying the steady state Coasean liability flow L¯21
for ever to agent 1 in order to keep 1 at down at the CSS level, k¯o1 < k¯u = k
o
1(0),
otherwise 1 would use its right to pollute at the PE1 level k¯u1 .
3.5 Downstream Agent determines the Externality
Suppose instead that downstream agent 2 has the right to be free from upstream
pollution P1. The initial conditions (35) is instead defined by agent 2’s private
equilibrium PE2 (kd1 , kd2) derived in appendix A.2. Since 2 has no benefit but
costs from upstream emissions generating production, it would set y1 = P = 0
imposing the constraint dk1/dt = 0. As a result, agent 1’s disagreement value
function is V1 ≡ 0. Using this in the rule (28) gives the liability payment from
agent 1 to agent 2.
L12(k1(t)) =
{
1
2
(a+ a1 − a2)
(
2ρi + δ1 +
1
2a2
)
− 1
a
}
k1(t)
1
2 ≤ 0 (52)
we also have
L21(k1(t)) =
{
1
2
(a− a1 + a2)
(
2ρi + δ1 +
1
2a2
)}
k1(t)
1
2 (53)
−bϕφ1
2φ2
k1(t)
1
2 ≥ 0
Again one can check that L12(k1(t)) = −L21(k1(t)) by using (64), (65) and (75).
The expected steady state payment by 1 to 2 can be derived by similar manner
as in the previous section.
3.6 Sensitivy Analysis of CBS - the Deterministic Case
Suppose that σi = 0 for i = 1, 2 then the qualitative analysis of the CBS vector
field for the deterministic case in the production space (y1, y2) is found around
the Coasean steady state (CSS). Agent 2’s private equilibrium PE2 is located
at the dk2/dt = 0 isocline where it intersects the y2-axis, while PE1 is located
below the same isocline. The bargaining solution when agent 1 has the right
to determine the externality level consists of the unique trajectory between
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PE1 as the initial condition and the CSS. On the other hand, when agent 2
has the right to determine the externality level, the bargaining solution would
have been the unique trajectory between PE2 as the initial condition and the
CSS provided that 1’s individuality condition had been satisfied. If the pollution
parameter ϕ increases, PE1 moves downwards and the dk2/dt = 0 isocline pivots
clockwise around its intersection with the y2-axis, implying that downstream
capital grows slower in the beginning towards the CSS when the polluter has
the right to pollute. The growth in downstream agent is further delayed by
a low downstream productivity level φi and/or high downstream depreciation
rate. If ϕ is great, the initial condition in PE1 may have a zero downstream
production. The growth of the downstream stock when the upstream agent has
the right to determine the externality ’ is further delayed by a low downstream
productivity level φi and/or high downstream depreciation rate of downstream
stock and nevertheless a high pollution parameter. Even though both agents
will gain in the long run, the downstream agent has to wait longer than the
upstream agent before it can collect the gains in terms of higher net growth.
4 Summary
For the first time, a subgame consistent cooperative solution ha been used to
analyze the classical Coasean bargaining solution (CBS) with stochastic stock
externalities in a differential bargaining game. A time consistent Coasean bar-
gaining solution has been formulated where a Coasean bargaining takes place
at t = 0 and results in a Pareto optimal ‘plan of trade’ containing agreed future
successive exchanges of reductions in externality and instantaneous flow of lia-
bility payment between two agents. It is essential that this initial plan be time
consistent. For this purpose, a rule was derived that identifies time consistent
Coasean liability (compensation) payment flows. A CBS concept with the fol-
lowing properties had been introduced. (1) The assignment of property rights
will not affect the expected Coasean steady state and the Pareto optimal paths
toward it. The agent that has the right to determine the externality level has
the advantage to choose initial conditions in the Coasean dynamic system. i.e.
whether the process starts in agent 1’s or agent 2’s private equilibrium steady
state. An analytical illustration was presented with a time consistent Coasean
liability payment flow that was a monotonous function of upstream stock level.
Growth in the downstream stock is delayed when upstream agent has the right
to pollute. When the bargaining game approaches the expected Coasean steady
state as t→∞, the agent that lacks the right to determine the externality level
has to continue paying the expected steady state liability flow to the agent that
has the right to determine the externality level.
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Appendix
A.1 Agent 1’s Private Equilibrium (PE1) Solution
Definition 4 If there exist value functions Vi(k1, k2, t) for i = 1, 2 that satisfy
Vi(k1, k2, t) = (54)∫ ∞
0
cui (t)
1
2 e−ρitdt ≥
∫ ∞
0
ci(t)
1
2 e−ρitdt
for all strategies ci(k1(t), k2(t), t) in the feasible set ci(t) ∈ [0, 1] ⊆ R2 which
satisfy the growth processes in the (k2, k1) state space
dk1(t) =
[
φ1k1(t)1/2 − δ1k1(t)− c1(t)
]
dt (55)
dk2(t) =
[
φ2k2(t)1/2 − δ2k2(t)− c2(t)− ϕy1(t)
y2(t)
k2(t)
]
dt (56)
ku1 (0) = k1,0 k
u
2 (0) = k2,0 (57)
then the closed loop Pareto optimal control paths are
cui
(
k1, k2, t
)
(58)
of the problems defined in (28) to (31).
The value functions in definition 1 and the dynamic system formed by (55) and
(56) have to satisfy the HJB partial differential equation system
−∂Vi(k1, k2, t)
∂t
= (59)
max
ci(t)
ci(t)
1
2 e−ρit +
∂Vi
∂k1
[
φ1k1(t)1/2 − δ1k1(t)− c1(t)
]
+
+
∂Vi
∂k2
[
φ2k2(t)1/2 − δ2k2(t)− c2(t)− ϕy1(t)
y2(t)
k2(t)
]
i = 1, 2
The closed loop controls cui (k1, k2, t) for i = 1, 2 are given by maximizing the
HJB differential equations (59) and solving for the control variable.
cu1 (k1(t)) =
(
1
2
/
∂V1
∂k1
)2
k1(t) (60)
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cu2 (k2(t)) =
(
1
2
/
∂V2
∂k2
)2
k2(t) (61)
The value function in definition 3 must be identified in order to specify the
optimal controls in (60) and (61).
Proposition 3 The value functions in (62) satisfy definition 3 and the indirect
HJB differential equation system formed by (59)
Vi
(
k1(t), k2(t)
)
=
(
aik1(t)
1
2 + bik2(t)
1
2 + ci
)
e−ρit i = 1, 2 (62)
Proof : Substituting (60) into the differential equations (59) forms the indirect
HJB differential equation system for i = 1, 2 as follows
−∂Vi(k1, k2, t)
∂t
= (63)[
1
2
/
∂Vi
∂ki
kui (t)
]
+
∂Vi
∂k1
[
φ1k
u
1 (t)
1/2 − δ1ku1 (t)−
(
1
2
/
∂Vi
∂k1
)2
ku1 (t)
]
+
∂Vi
∂k2
[
φ2k
u
2 (t)
1/2 − δ2ku2 (t)−
(
1
2
/
∂Vi
∂k2
)2
ku2 (t)− ϕ
yu1 (t)
yu2 (t)
ku2 (t)
]
ku2 (t)
The coefficients of the values functions in (62) are determined by an equation
system formed by (63) resulting in six equations in (64) and (65) and the six
unknowns (a1, b1, c1, a2, b2, c2).
a1 =
(
1
2ρi + δ1
) 1
2
(64)
b1 = 0
c1 =
a1φ1
2ρi
a2 = −b22 ·
ϕφ1/φ2
2ρi + δ1
(65)
b2 =
(
1
2ρi + δ2
) 1
2
c2 =
b2φ2
2ρi
By differentiating (62), the closed loop optimal controls in (60) and (61) can be
expressed in terms of parameters
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cu1 (k1(t)) =
(
1
a1
)2
k1(t) (66)
cu2 (k2(t)) =
(
1
b2
)2
k2(t) (67)
Since the HJB equations in (59) are time autonomous with infinite time horizon,
the controls are Markov stationary (i.e. functions of only state variables).
Substituting the optimal controls in the state equations (55) and (56) yields
the stock dynamics that constitutes the private equilibrium PE1 vector field in
the (k2, k1) space.
dk1(t) =
[
φ1k
u
1 (t)
1/2 − δ1ku1 (t)−
(
1
a1
)2
ku1 (t)
]
dt (68)
dk2(t) =
[
φ2k
u
2 (t)
1/2 − δ2ku2 (t)−
(
1
b2
)2
ku2 (t)− ϕ
yu1 (t)
yu2 (t)
ku2 (t)
]
dt (69)
ku1 (0) = k1,0 k
u
2 (0) = k2,0 (70)
Using (68) and (69) with (64) and (65) agent 1’s private equilibrium steady
state levels (ku1 , ku2 ) can be expressed in terms of parameter
k¯u1 =
[
φ1
2ρi + δ1
]2
(71)
k¯u2 =
[
φ2 − ϕφ1/φ22ρi+δ1
2ρi + δ2
]2
A.2 Agent 2’s Private Equilibrium (PE2) Solution
Suppose that agent 2 has the right to be free from pollution P . Clearly, 2 would
set emissions generating production y1 to zero as 2 has no benefit but damage
from P . Given that P = 0, agent 2 maximizes (28) - (31) subject to k¯d1 = 0 for
all t resulting in the optimal control
cd2(k1(t)) =
(
1
b2
)2
k2(t) (72)
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and with the corresponding dynamics of k2 in (69) the steady state (kd1 , kd2) is
k¯d1 = 0 (73)
k¯d2 =
[
φ2
2ρi + δ2
]2
agent 1 has to take the restriction dk1/dt = 0 as given in PE2 implying that
the disagreement payoff V1 ≡ 0.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1 in CBS
Substituting (42) and (43) into the partial differential equation (41) forms the
stochastic dynamic programming equation as follows
−∂W (k1, k2, t)
∂t
= (74)[
1
2
/
∂W
∂k1
k1(t) +
1
2
/
∂W
∂k2
k2(t)
]
+
∂W
∂k1
[
φ1k1(t)1/2 − δ1k1(t)−
(
1
2
/
∂W
∂k1
)2
k1(t)
]
+
∂W
∂k2
[
φ2k2(t)1/2 − δ2k2(t)−
(
1
2
/
∂W
∂k2
)2
k2(t)− ϕy1(t)
y2(t)
k2(t)
]
k2(t)
The coefficients of the values function in (44) is determined by the partial dif-
ferential equation system (74). Solving for the three unknowns (a, b, c) yields
a = −bϕφ1/φ2
2ρi + δ2
+
[(
bϕφ1/φ2
2ρi + δ2
)2
+
1
2ρi + δ2
] 1
2
(75)
b =
(
1
2ρi + δ2
) 1
2
= b1
c =
aφ1 + bφ2
2
where (a, b, c) are uniquely determined.
A.4 Stability around CSS - Deterministic case
Variable transformations of the system, (37) and (38), defining production as
y1(t) = φ1k1(t)
1
2 and y2(t) = φ2k2(t)
1
2 , yield the linear differential equation
system when σi = 0.
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[
dy1(t)
dy2(t)
]
=
1
2
[ −δ1 − 1/a2 0
−ϕ −δ2 − 1/b2
] [
y1(t)dt
y2(t)dt
]
+
[
φ21
2
φ22
2
]
The last column vector on the RHS is the isoclines’ intersections with the y1
and y2-axis. The isoclines in the production space (y1, y2) are
y1|y˙1=0 =
φ1
δ1 + 1/a2
(76)
y2|y˙2=0 =
φ2 − ϕy1
δ2 + 1/a2
(77)
In the state space (k2, k1) the isoclines are
k1|k˙1=0 =
[
φ1
δ1 + 1/a2
]2
(78)
k2|k˙2=0 =
[
φ2 − ϕy1
δ2 + 1/b2
]2
(79)
The isoclines (76) and (78) have zero slopes in the, while (77) and (79) have
negative slopes (y1, y2) and (k1, k2) spaces respectively. Computing vectors in
each of the areas bordered by isoclines in (76) and (77) and the y1-axis and the
y2-axis in the (y1, y2) ⊆ R2+ space reveals the vector field. If ϕ = 0 the vector
field reduces to a star node. The characteristic roots of the Jacobian matrix are
λ1,2 =
−(δ1 + 1/a2)− (δ1 + 1/b2)
2
(80)
±
√
[−(δ1 + 1/a2)− (δ1 + 1/b2)]2 − 4[(δ1 + 1/a2)(δ1 + 1/b2)]
2
Both eigenvalues have negative real parts. The characteristic roots are real for
all nonnegative parameter values since
[(δ1 + 1/a2)− (δ1 + 1/b2)]2 ≥ 0 (81)
——————————————————————
22
References
Allen, D. (1991), ‘What are transaction costs?’, Research in Law and Economics
14, 1–18.
Barzel, Y. (1989), Economic Analysis of Property Rights, Cambridge University
Press.
Basar, T. and Olsder, G. (1999), Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, second
edition edn, Philadelpiha SIAM.
Calabresi, G. (1968), ‘Transaction costs, resource allocations and liability rules:
A comment’, Journal of Law and Economics 11, 67–73.
Coase, R. (1960), ‘The problem of social cost’, Journal of Law and Economics
3, 1–44.
Filar, J. and Petrosjan, L. (2000), ‘Dynamic cooperative games’, International
Game Theory Review 2, 47–65.
Fleming, W. and Richel, R. (1975), Determinstic and Stochastic Optimal Con-
trol, Springer Verlag.
Fresh, H. (1979), ‘The extended coase theorem and long run equilbrium: The
non-equivalence of liability rules and property rights’, Economic Inquiry
27, 254–268.
Haurie, A. (1976), ‘A note on nonzero-sum differential games with bargaining
solution’, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 18, 31–39.
Haurie, A. and Zaccour, G. (1995), ‘Differential game models of global environ-
ment management’, Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games
2, 3–24.
Hoffman, E. and Spitzer, M. (1982), ‘The coase theorem: Some experimental
tests’, Journal of LAw and Economics 25, 73–98.
Jorgensen, S. and Zaccour, G. (2001), ‘Time consistent side payments in a
dynamic game of downstream pollution’, Journal of Economic Dynamic and
Control 25, 1973–1987.
Kamien, M., Schwartz, N. and Dolbear, F. (1966), ‘Asymmetry between bribes
and charges’, Water Resources Research 2, 147–157.
Petrosjan, L. (1997), ‘Agreeable solutions in differential games’, International
Journal of Mathematics, Game Theory and Algebra 7, 165–177.
Petrosjan, L. and Zenkevich, N. (1996), Game Theory, World Scientific Singa-
pore.
Regan, D. (1972), ‘The problem of social cost revisited’, Journal of Law and
Economics 15, 427–437.
23
Saraydar, E. (1983), ‘Bargaining power, dissimulation anf the coase theorem’,
Journal oif Institutional and Theorethical Economics 139, 599–611.
Schweizer, U. (1988), ‘Externalities and the coase theorem: Hypothesis or re-
sult?’, Journal of Institutional and Theorethical Economics 144, 245–266.
Starret, D. (1972), ‘Fundamental nonconvexities in the theory of externalites’,
Journal of Economic Theory 4, 180–199.
Tybout, R. (1972), ‘Pricing pollution and other negative externalities’, Bell
Journal of Economics 3, 252–266.
Wellisz, S. (1964), ‘On external diseconomies and the government - assisted
invisible hand’, Economica 31, 345–362.
Yeung, D. (2004), ‘Technical note: Nontransferable individal payoffs in coopera-
tive stochastic differential games’, International Game Theory Review 6, 281–
289.
Yeung, D. and Petrosjan, L. (2004), ‘Subgame consistent cooperative solutions
in stochastic differential games’, Journal of Optimization Theory and Appli-
cations 120, 651–666.
Yeung, D. and Petrosjan, L. (2005), ‘Subgame consistent solutions of a coop-
erative stochastic differential game with nontransferable payoffs’, Journal of
Optimization Theory and Applications 124, 701–724.
Yeung, D. and Petrosjan, L. (2006), Cooperative Stochastic Differential Games,
Springer Science Business Media, Inc.
24
